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availability fee accompanied such development activity, the water availability fee was an impact fee. Alternatively, Keystone argued the town
of Toquerville would not approve Keystone's subdivision development
absent Keystone procuring secondary water service from the Water
District, and hence the water availability fee was an impact fee. The
district court agreed with Keystone's primary contention and held the
water availability fee was an impact fee. The Water District appealed to
the Supreme Court of Utah.
The Act defined an impact fee as a "payment of money imposed
upon development activity as a condition of development approval."
Development activity meant "any changes in the use of land that create[d] additional demand and need for public facilities." The Act required any public entity imposing an impact fee to justify the fee. Justification included preparing capital facilities plans, demonstrating the
degree of impact on system improvements, proportioning costs attributed to new development, and calculating the fee. Additionally, the
Act required the entity imposing the fee to establish accounting
mechanisms and processes for challenging the impact fee.
The court held the water availability fee was not an impact fee pursuant to the Act. The court found that, while the subdivision itself created additional demand for secondary water, construction of a secondary water system alone merely served that demand. The Water District did not authorize construction of a secondary water system on a
developer's property, nor did the Water District have the authority to
preclude a developer from constructing a secondary water system. The
court concluded the Water District's approval was not necessary for the
development of property and, therefore, Water District approval alone
did not authorize development activity as defined by the Act.
The court also held Keystone's alternative argument was not ripe
for review. Keystone contended the Water District's approval predicated the town of Toquerville's development approval. The court
stated many other approvals, such as contractor licenses and certifications, were also necessary predicates to Toquerville's approval, but the
water availability fee alone did not constitute an impact fee. The court
stated Keystone failed to show sufficient evidence that Water District
approval alone, demonstrated by payment of the water availability fee,
ensured Toquerville's approval. Thus, the court declined to review this
argument.
The court reversed the district court ruling and held the water
availability fee was not an impact fee pursuant to the Act.
Suzanne Knowle
Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'l Water Special Serv. Dist.,
108 P.3d 119 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (holding a county could promulgate water regulations under the county's land use planning authority
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and extensive water regulation at the state level did not preempt
county water regulation).
In November 2002 Summit County promulgated Ordinance No.
436 ("ordinance") under the authority of Utah's County Land Use Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA"). The ordinance required all public and private water suppliers in the county to file annual supply and demand studies that included, among other requirements, water companies' currently available water rights, water source
capacity, reserve source capacity, outstanding commitment-for-service
letters, current number of service connections, and surplus capacity.
The ordinance allowed Summit County to prevent issuance of new
building permits unless a physical water supply to serve new connections existed. Under the ordinance, a water supplier could not issue
the mandatory commitment-of-service letter to a new customer unless
Summit County's district engineer and health department certified the
supplier had the present ability to provide the physical water in accordance with county and state water regulations.
Mountain Regional Water Special Service District ("Mountain Regional") filed an annual supply and demand study with Summit County
on January 31, 2003. Summit County's district engineer recommended
approval of Mountain Regional's study on March 3, 2003, and the
county health director approved the study the day after.
Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water") filed a
complaint against Mountain Regional and Summit County in the
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department on June 26, 2003.
The complaint claimed the study misrepresented Mountain Regional's
ability to provide water to new and existing customers in Snyderville
Basin. The complaint sought mandamus and injunctive relief pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Summit Water demanded Mountain Regional file a true and accurate supply and demand study. Summit Water's complaint also sought mandamus and
injunctive relief against Summit County's district engineer and health
director, insisting those individuals perform their investigative and analytical obligations under the ordinance.
Mountain Regional and Summit County moved to dismiss, asserting that Summit Water failed to seek relief through other adequate
measures. Specifically, Mountain Regional and Summit County argued
Summit Water should have challenged Summit County's decisions
through the ordinance and through CLUDMA.
The district court dismissed the action, observing that Mountain
Regional was not an administrative agency. The district court also dismissed Summit Water's request for mandamus against Summit County
because the district court could not impose its will on the county and
because Summit County's decision was a land use decision within the
ambit of CLUDMA. Specifically, courts should not grant mandamus
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where other remedies were available. The district court found Summit
Water should have petitioned for review under the ordinance, and that
the thirty-day timeframe to challenge a county's land use decisions had
already expired.
On appeal, Summit Water argued the district court's rulings that
CLUDMA authorized Summit County to promulgate the ordinance
and that the timely filing constraints of CLUDMA did not apply to
Summit Water. To support this contention, Summit Water argued
Utah's comprehensive regulation of water precluded Summit County
from regulating water under CLUDMA.
The Utah Court of Appeals gave no deference to the district court's
statutory interpretations. The court held CLUDMA's authorization for
county land use ordinance-making did not exclude water regulations
such as the ordinance. While the court determined no Utah law explicitly authorized land use decisions to encompass water decisions, the
court reviewed treatises, persuasive authority, and the language of
CLUDMA to conclude that county water decisions fell under the ambit
of land use decisions.
CLUDMA allowed counties "to provide for the health, safety, and
welfare" of their "present and future inhabitants." The ordinance
"recognize[d] that the health, safety[,] and welfare of the inhabitants
of Snyderville Basin, depended in large part, on the availability of
drinking water and the reliability of the water suppliers." The court
noted other jurisdictions upheld zoning ordinances ensuring essential
services such as water, and concluded water decisions fell under the
umbrella of land use safeguards contemplated by CLUDMA.
Regarding Summit Water's contention that Utah preempted the
regulation of water, the court stated no legislative attempt to preempt
local regulation of water existed. On the contrary, the legislature explicitly allowed local jurisdictions to control water systems, if not otherwise inconsistent with state law. The court thus affirmed the district
court's decision.
Lukas Staks
WASHINGTON
City of West Richland v. Dep't of Ecology, 103 P.3d 818 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding the owner of inchoate groundwater permits may
alter the manner of use of his permits, but may not alter the purpose of
use of his permits).
In August 1993 the Department of Ecology ("DOE") granted two
family farm groundwater permits to John Michel pursuant to the Family Farm Water Act ("FFWA"). Michel failed to meet development
schedules stipulated in the permits and, in October 2000, DOE issued
an order to show cause, asking Michel to explain his inaction regarding his permits. Before Michel answered DOE's order, the Benton

